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The Prosecution of International Crimes:
Prospects and Pitfalls
Justice Louise Arbour*
The following essay is based on a presentation given by
Justice Louise Arbour as the Holocaust Memorial Lecturer at
Washington University on 28 October 1998.
On February 25, 1998 the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire,
Commander of the United Nations mission to Rwanda in the first part
of 1994, testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania.1 He said: “[I]t seems to be
unimaginable that every day in the media we see people being
massacred and yet [we] fold [our] arms, [we] remain unperturbed,
[we] remain isolated without wanting to come to aid, [without wanting
to come] to their assistance.”2 He went on to say the following:
In my opinion, it has always been very easy to accuse the
United Nations of not having intervened, but the United Nations
[is] not a sovereign country. [We are] the United Nations, all of
us, and if the United Nations [does] not intervene this means
that by extension all of us failed . . . that all of us have a
responsibility for the genocide that continued in Rwanda for
almost four months.3
The fact that General Dallaire spoke these words in a court of law
* Justice Arbour was appointed the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by the
United Nations Security Council in 1996. Justice Arbour is on a leave-of-absence from her position
as a Justice of the Ontario Court of Appeals, where she has served since 1990.
1. General Dallaire testified in the case of Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T [hereinafter Akayesu].
2. Transcript of testimony of General Romeo Dallaire before the Rwanda tribunal, Feb. 25,
1998, at 197, lines 9-13, available at <Error! Bookmark not defined.>.
3. Id. at lines 15-23.
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before an International Tribunal, as a witness in the case of a man who
has since been convicted for his participation in that genocide4 and
sentenced to imprisonment for life, is the subject of my talk before you
today.
More has been achieved in the last five years than in the preceding
fifty to bring to account in their personal capacity some of the worst
human predators in modern history.5 The  are men, usually in
positions of great power, influence, and control, that killed or oversaw
the killing, rape, torture, and persecution of their fellow human beings.
They chose to deprive their victims of their very humanity. These same
men had every reason to believe that they were immune from scrutiny,
immune from accountability, and clothed with the impenetrable veneer
of state sovereignty, which they conveniently appropriated to
themselves as the embodiment of absolute power.
Measured against the performance of the preceding decades, it is
undeniably true that much has been accomplished in the last five
years. There are over sixty persons in custody before the two
International Criminal Tribunals awaiting trial or appeal to answer for
their participation in genocide, widespread or systematic murders,
persecutions on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds, and the previously
unspeakable sexual violence that often accompanied the carnage.6 T
4. Akayesu, supra note 1, Judgment of Sept. 2, 1998. A summary of the Akayesu judgment
is available at 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998). The entire judgment is available on the Rwanda Tribunal
website at <Error! Bookmark not defined.>.
5. In addition to the activity of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, a treaty establishing a permanent International Criminal Court was opened for signature
on July 17, 1998.
6. See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. See
GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/1, ¶¶ 176-179 (1998) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report];
Third Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January
and 31 December 1994, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 50, at ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/53/429
(1998) [hereinafter ICTR Report]; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. S/1998/862, at ¶ 31 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY
Report]. For an updated list of persons indicted by the Yugoslavia Tribunal, see <Error!
Bookmark not defined.>, visited May 6, 1999. For an updated list of persons in the custody of
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, see <Error! Bookmark not defined.>, visited May 6, 1999. For an
updated list of persons indicted by the Rwanda Tribunal, see <Error! Bookmark not defined.>,
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former Prime Minister of Rwanda has pleaded guilty to six counts of
genocide and admitted his criminal role in the extermination of more
than half a million people.7 Others denying their culpability, as is their
right, have been convicted in an open and transparent process before
an international court applying widely accepted international standards
of criminal justice.8
Modest as it may appear to some, the progress of the last five years
is by some measures in the range of the truly remarkable. I do believe
that there are few in this audience who will be prone to underestimate
the determination and the potency of the many interests that can
congregate to curtail the reach of the law. Leadership is not always
open to scrutiny and censure. Abusive leadership is considerably less
open than the average, more benign power. Criminal leadership is
flatly uncooperative and obstructive, and that is on good days. On the
international scene where some view the concept of state sovereignty
as deserving of blind protection regardless of what it serves to hide,
abusive and indeed criminal leadership often finds itself a bedfellow
with convenience.
The Security Council of the United Nations created two
International Criminal Tribunals. The first, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),9 some said, was born of
the frustration of having exhausted all other measures to stop an
incredibly brutal war except the measures that took too much courage
to generate consensus. The second, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR),10 other cynics might suggest, was born of the
sheer guilt of having done little more than count the hundred days that
it took for half a million people to be killed by their countrymen
visited May 6, 1999.
7. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence of 4
September 1998, available at 37 I.L.M. 1411 (1998) [hereinafter Kmabanda].
8. See, e.g., Akayesu, supra note 1; Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic a/k/a “Dule”, Case No. IT-
94-1, Judgement of May 7, 1997; Prosecutor v. Zejnal Delalic, Judgement of November 16, 1998
(“Celebici”).
9. Established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
10. Established by S.C. Res 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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somewhere in Africa.
This is often put to me, aggressively at times, as though we should
be ashamed of partaking in an otherwise laudable project yet which
has this kind of pedigree. I have spent my entire professional life
working with, in, or around criminal law. I believe that I have a
realistic sense of what it can and cannot do and what it should and
should not do. Recourse to criminal law enforcement is often an
implicit admission of failure. It is a failure of one or more of the many
social institutions designed to protect a society from self-destruction.
Examples of these institutions include decent education, shelter and
nourishment, access to essential mental health services, adequate child
care and child protection agencies, responsible corporate citizenry, and
caring families, neighborhoods, or other social units. As with
everything, it is all a question of balance. A society that would be
complacent about the bankruptcy of most of its important institutions
and that would be content to use criminal law to maintain a semblance
of order would quickly fall into an autocratic state where the quest for
power would be the only possible desirable goal. On the other hand,
the criminal sanction should work in parallel with the revamping of the
deficient social-welfare institutions that may have served to prevent
the harm that criminal law is asked to redress. In the international
environment in which the two Tribunals operate, the ratings of other
institutions, indeed in some cases their total absence, is all too
apparent. It leaves criminal justice to meet the sometimes unrealistic
expectations about the contribution that it can make to social peace
and harmony, to the eradication of hatred, and to the reconciliation of
previously warring factions.
Meanwhile, the long debated ideal of establishing a permanent
forum in which to call to account those who offend against the peace
of the whole world took a life of its own in the last five years.11 It also,
against the expectations of many, led to the adoption in Rome last
June of the text of a treaty that, if not derailed, will lay the foundations
11. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A HISTORICAL DOCUMENTARY (forthcoming).
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of a credible and promising institution.12 It s ot a perfect one but one
much better than many of us feared would be born of the incredible
pressure to compromise impressed upon those who were so tired of
waiting that they might have been seduced by any deal at any cost. I
believe that it is of critical importance that we define appropriately the
role of international criminal justice, that we fully empower the courts
to do what they are designed to do, and that we resist the temptation to
use them as inadequate substitutes for the many other ways in which
civil societies must be reconstructed after war and sustained in their
search for peace.
Quite apart from the obvious practical difficulties in conducting
investigations and obtaining custody of the accused, the marriage of
international law and criminal law and the merging of vastly different
legal systems is a great challenge. The concept of state sovereignty is
at the crossroads of public international law and criminal law—a
meeting point where these two unlikely partners are trying to merge
into what may develop as a truly novel branch of public law.
International law, which is primarily interested in relations between
states, is first and foremost political, profoundly consensual, and
extremely deferential to state sovereignty. Criminal law, by contrast, is
coercive and authoritarian, yet concerned with, if not outright
suspicious of, the unlimited powers of the state and well aware of the
pitfalls of political interference and abuse of power.
Many have spoken about the extraordinary significance of the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has referred to
the ICC as “the gift of hope for future generations and a giant step
forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of
law.”13 It is truly an occasion to celebrate the further progress of the
rule of law over the rule of force and the repudiation of state
sovereignty as pretext for impunity of powerful criminals. It is also an
occasion to demonstrate that the legal process can contribute to
12. Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, July 17,
1998 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
13. Secretary-General Says Establishment Of International Criminal Court Is Gift Of
Hope To Future Generations, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6643 L/2891 (1998).
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dispute resolution, even in an environment previously dominated
almost exclusively by diplomacy or military intervention with the
limited success evidenced by current events in Kosovo,14 the
Democratic Republic of Congo,15 and elsewhere throughout the world.
The ICC is, however, only a work in progress. The statute requires
sixty ratifications for it to come into force.16 Many issues need to be
agreed upon further, such as the definition of the crime of aggression17
and the elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.18 The
ratification process will likely keep the debate on the role of the Court
at the forefront of the international agenda for years. Meanwhile, the
work of the two ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda will continue to serve both as a procedural and a practical
laboratory for the enforcement of the laws of war. Much more
importantly, however, it will serve as a test of the true will of the
international community to allow the criminal process to unfold,
stressful as this process obviously is at times, for those who are called
upon to contribute.
As with most institutions, particularly novel ones, the Tribunals are
required to meet many expectations, some of which are more realistic
than others. I am pleased to report that the early expectation of total
failure, shared principally by those who had every interest to see
criminal justice fail, has now been replaced by the more realistic
acknowledgment that the work of the Tribunals will not cease. The
critical issue for me is now the pace and the quality of the work. We
are indicting persons who possess the appropriate level of
responsibility to be made answerable before an international
jurisdiction.19 Most of the persons indicted by the Rwanda Tribunal
14. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160
(1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1221 (1998).
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1234, 54th Sess., U.N. SCOR, 3993d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1234
(1999).
16. ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 126. As of May 4, 1999, 82 States had signed the
Statute and two had ratified it.
17. Id. art. 5(2).
18. Id. at Annex I, ¶ F(5).
19. See ICTY Statute, supra note 9, arts. 1, 7; ICTR Statute, supra note 10, arts. 1, 6.
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are in custody in Arusha.20 More than half of those publicly indicted
by the Yugoslav Tribunal have also been arrested,21 th  most recent
one at the end of September 1998.22 Indictees and suspects in both
institutions have surrendered voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the
Court.23 Some have pleaded guilty, including Jean Kambanda, the
former Prime Minister of Rwanda, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment on September 4, 1998 for his admitted participation in
the 1994 genocide.24 Two days before, the Arusha Tribunal issued a
landmark decision in the case of the Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul
Akayesu,25 convicting him of genocide and crimes against humanity. It
laid out, in a scholarly and persuasive fashion, the foundations for the
prosecution of sexual violence as genocide,26 crim s against
humanity,27 and violation of the laws and customs of war.28
The two Tribunals continue to depend immensely on international
assistance and support. In the case of the Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, several issues continue to test the determination of the
international community to support fully an international criminal
jurisdiction. The first such issue is the arrest of the remaining
indictees, including that of Radovan Karadic and Ratko Mladic.29
Although more than half of the publicly-indicted accused have been
surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, none must be allowed
to escape the reach of international sanction, particularly those whose
previous position of power should make them more answerable for
their alleged criminal actions.
The second issue that continues to illustrate the dependence of
international justice on the goodwill of states is the question of access
20. See ICTR Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 1.
21. See ICTY Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 31.
22. Id.
23. See ICTR Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 1; ICTY Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 31.
24. Kambanda, supra note 7.
25. Akayesu, supra note 1.
26. Id. at ¶¶ 507-08.
27. Id. at ¶¶ 563-98.
28. Id. at ¶¶ 599-637.
29. Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18 (Nov. 16, 1995)
(Indictment) [hereinafter Srebrenica]; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case
No. IT-95-5 (July 25, 1995) (Indictment).
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to evidence. Both the states that were directly implicated in the conflict
within which the crimes were committed, and to a lesser degree the
states that played a peripheral role, either through their involvement in
peacekeeping operations or simply as third party observers, have been
reluctant in varying degrees to provide the evidence required to
support the work of the Prosecutor.30 Committed as they purport to be
to the ideal of international criminal justice, they are often unwilling to
make the concrete contribution required of them, particularly if they
are asked to disclose information that they view as politically
embarrassing or adverse to their diplomatic or other interests. The
same, unfortunately, is also true of international organizations, which
advance the superior claim of their operational needs so that they may
decline to come forward with evidence relevant to our proceedings.
This inertia or, at worst, the actual obstruction of the Tribunal’s
work is a major impediment to the ability of the Prosecutor to develop
investigations in a timely and relevant fashion. Allegations of massive
violations of human rights cannot realistically be investigated to the
standard required of a criminal investigation without the assistance of
sovereign states.
In the case of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the excellent
cooperation of many states, particularly African states such as
Cameroon, Kenya, Benin, Togo, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and, of course,
the host country of the Tribunal, Tanzania, have facilitated the timely
arrest of many high ranking indictees. I believe that in the ICTR we
can prove the existence of a sophisticated conspiracy to commit
genocide, and I will do everything in my power to prosecute,
preferably jointly, those responsible for this vast common criminal
enterprise. Despite the difficulties of the task, the Tribunal continues
to strive to dispense justice visibly and expeditiously, in accordance
with the legitimate expectations of the people of Rwanda and of all
those elsewhere who care.
The crimes investigated and prosecuted before the ad hoc
30. See, e.g., Justice Louise Arbour, Press Conference by Prosecutor of International
Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, March 5, 1999; S.C. Res. 1207, U.N. SCOR, 53d
Sess., 3944th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1208 (1998).
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Tribunals, as well as those which will fall within the jurisdiction of the
ICC, are the most horrendously violent large-scale attacks on human
life; they include genocide;31 widespread or systematic persecutions on
racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds;32 murder;33 rape;34
torture;35 deportation;36 and the enslavement of civil populations.37
These crimes inflict unspeakable harm upon the social fabric of the
societies in which they are committed and often even to the social
group to which the perpetrators belong.
The achievements of the two Tribunals to date are truly remarkable
achievements in a world that tolerates the grossest violations of human
rights by political or military leaders. Despite the far-reaching
potential of the ad hoc Tribunals of the ICC, there are huge obstacles
to overcome. There is a great distance between the establishment of a
criminal jurisdiction on paper and rendering it operational and
effective. The pragmatic dimensions of setting up such an institution
should not be overlooked nor should their difficulty be underestimated.
In creating a permanent court many difficult issues will arise,
including the location and construction of suitable physical premises
such as courtrooms and detention facilities, the formulation of rules of
procedure and evidence that reflect the diverse legal systems, and the
recruitment of qualified investigators and prosecutors. The prosecutors
of the court will be required to work with interpreters and in a cultural
environment unfamiliar to them. They also must gather witness
testimony and evidence in several states where refugee populations are
31. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 2; ICC Statute,
supra note 12, art. 6.
32. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(h); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(h); ICC
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(h).
33. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(a); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(a); ICC
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(a).
34. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(g); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(g); ICC
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(g).
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(f); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(f); ICC Statute,
supra note 12, art. 7(1)(f).
36. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(d); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(d); ICC
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(d).
37. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(c); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 3(c); ICC Statute,
supra note 12, art. 7(1)(c).
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located or in a country devastated by war and often where basic
infrastructure such as roads and telephones have been impaired or
destroyed. They will not have ready access to documents that are vital
to the preparation of cases against suspects, and they will have to
translate mountains of information, which may prove useless. Finally,
they will have to rely entirely on state cooperation and international
political pressure to secure the apprehension of suspects. All of these
difficulties are byproducts of operating without any preexisting law
enforcement infrastructure.
It might be useful here to recall some of the important differences
between the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg38 and
the two ad hoc Tribunals. As the name indicates the Nuremburg
Tribunal was a military institution; it was multi-national rather than
truly international. It was also composed of the four victorious Allies39
as part of a political settlement. The war was over when the
International Military Tribunal was created. It was still raging in the
former Yugoslavia, however, when ICTY was set up. In Nuremberg,
most defendants were in custody. The IMT had a staff of two
thousand, including one hundred prosecutors, four chief prosecutors
and four judges (with four alternates).40 It had very basic rules of
procedure and evidence41—only eleven rules—and trials in absentia
were permitted.42 Martin Borman, for instance, was tried in his
absence.43 The IMT could and did impose the death penalty44 and there
was no right of appeal.45
In contrast, the two ad hoc Tribunals reflect a huge evolution in
38. Established by Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, London, Aug. 8, 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257
(1945) (Supp.) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
39. The Allies were France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
40. IMT Charter, supra note 38, art. 2.
41. Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal, adopted Oct. 29, 1945,
reprinted in I BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD
WORLD PEACE—A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 464-68 (1980).
42. IMT Charter, supra note 38, art. 12.
43. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 173 (1947).
44. IMT Charter, supra note 38, art. 27.
45. Id. art. 26.
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criminal justice standards. This includes, to name one, prosecutorial
disclosure obligations of immense proportions,46 with which we are
struggling to comply. More important still, the most precious feature
of domestic criminal justice that we must generate and cultivate in the
international context, but which we cannot take for granted, is the
widespread acceptability and credibility of judicial organs, upon which
its coercive powers can safely be based.
In functioning democracies courts generally enjoy a large measure
of acceptability. The general population, immediate victims of crimes,
and offenders alike generally perceive judges as unbiased and fair and
as imbued with knowledge and integrity. This is not universal but
sufficiently widely shared to permit the easy functioning of the courts
without recourse to massive physical coercion. It is the general
consensual aspect of criminal justice that permits it to be coercive
against the few recalcitrants. In the international context,
unfortunately, there is no preexisting basis of credibility upon which
the Tribunal can rest to develop the appropriate coercive powers from
a solid consensual base.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the two ad hoc Tribunals
are operating against an entrenched “culture of impunity,”47 where
enforcement of humanitarian law is the rare exception and not the rule.
It is instructive here to consider the process by which criminal justice
affirms and reinforces the norms of conduct that are acceptable and
denounces those that are not. Trial courts tend to convey clear and
easily understood information. They help to build a social consensus to
promote compliance with the law even when the risk of capture and
punishment is minimal. It is in this context that the role and ultimate
effectiveness of the Tribunals should be understood.
Any assessment of the Tribunal’s deterrence and peace-building
capability must consider that, in the conduct of international affairs,
impunity from massive human rights violations has traditionally been
46. See generally International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.13 (1998), available at <Error! Bookmark not
defined.>; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
available at <http://www.ictr.org/rules.html>.
47. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994).
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the rule, whereas accountability has been the rare exception.48 Against
this prevalent culture of impunity, it is entirely unrealistic to expect
that an ad hoc Tribunal, created amidst an ongoing war of exceptional
savagery or after a genocide of monstrous proportions, can somehow
immediately inculcate civilized conduct among adversaries. Moreover,
it cannot bring about an immediate, fundamental transformation of
views in a post-conflict situation or even fundamentally alter the
values prevalent in international politics. Effective deterrence is part of
a long-term civilizing process beginning with the explicit disapproval
of mass violence against civilians as a political instrument and ending
with a condition of widespread respect for the law, where deviation
from fundamental norms becomes the exception and not the rule.
Notwithstanding the immediate challenges of the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the Tribunals must strive to make a contribution towards
eradicating a culture of impunity and must hope to constitute a
significant and revolutionary first-step in the establishment of
institutions capable of delivering international criminal justice.
In closing, allow me to share with you a few very personal
reflections on my own work with the Tribunals. Preoccupied and
engaged as we prosecutors are in the present in a very hands-on,
operational manner, particularly now in light of the events taking place
into Kosovo,49 we are also intensely reliving the very painful past of
the Yugoslav war era. Earlier this month I briefed the diplomatic corps
in The Hague on our exhumations work in Bosnia as part of our
fundraising effort to secure the financing that will allow us to continue
this important forensic work next year. I have attended these
exhumation sites and have reviewed the video presentation for the
diplomatic briefing. The images are, of course, tragic and disturbing.
As I looked again at the images of the bodies of some of the men
killed at Srebrenica50 emerging from the ground, I was reminded of the
48. The ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC are the first major efforts to try war criminals since
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, notwithstanding the fact that the twentieth century has seen
numerous large-scale commissions of atrocities including, perhaps most notably, the massacres of
the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.
49. Shortly after giving this speech, Justice Arbour led a delegation into Kosovo to
investigate allegations of war crimes. The Serbs refused to allow the delegation to enter.
50. See Srebrenica, supra note 29.
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powerful tale in Anne Michael’s wonderful book Fugitive Pieces.51
Some of you may recall the story of the learned, well respected, and
well-known rabbi who disguised himself as a modest beggar while he
traveled in a train to a nearby town to give a lecture.52 He did so to
avoid being recognized and disturbed during his trip, so that he could
work and think quietly. His fellow passengers indeed did not recognize
him and gave him disapproving stares every time they saw this beggar
on the train. When he was greeted on arrival as the great master, the
train passengers were ashamed and embarrassed at the way they had
treated him and asked his forgiveness, but he would not respond. They
pursued their request for forgiveness from the great rabbi for months
but to no avail. After a year, somewhat angrily, they told him that he
had to agree to extend his forgiveness or explain why he would not.
The rabbi replied, “All this time you have been asking the wrong man.
You must ask the man on the train to forgive you.”53 As we speak of
national reconciliation through justice, I often wonder whether we can
ask for forgiveness—not from the man on the train but from the men
on the buses that left Srebrenica in July 1995.
51. ANNE MICHAELS, FUGITIVE PIECES (1997).
52. Id. at 160.
53. Id.
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